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Abstract 
The relationship between public and private self-consciousness and self-report questionnaires, clini-
cian ratings, and various measures derived from an individualized simulation of an anxiety-provoking 
situation was examined in a sample of men and women seeking treatment for social phobia. As pre-
dicted, public, not private, self-consciousness was generally related to self-report and naive observer 
ratings of anxiety and to behavioral disruption during the simulation. The predicted relationship 
between public self-consciousness and how accurately subjects evaluated their performance in the 
anxiety-provoking situation was marginally supported. Hypotheses regarding the relationship be-
tween private self-consciousness and self-reported anxiety during an anxiety-provoking situation, 
and between private self-consciousness and the correspondence between physiological assessment 
and self-report, were not supported. The discussion focuses on methodological issues and the theo-
retical implications of the relationship between self-consciousness and social anxiety. 
 
Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) developed the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) to assess 
individual differences in dispositional self-awareness. The SCS consists of three subscales 
labeled public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety. Public self-
consciousness was defined as awareness of the public aspects of oneself and was measured 
by items such as “I’m concerned about the way I present myself” and “One of the last 
things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror.” Private self-consciousness, the 
awareness of private aspects of oneself, such as thoughts and feelings, was measured by 
items such as “I’m alert to changes in my mood” and “I reflect about myself a lot.” The 
third subscale, social anxiety, assessed discomfort in the presence of other people and in-
cluded items such as “Large groups make me nervous” and “I have trouble working when 
someone is watching me.” Fenigstein and colleagues reported that the public and private 
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self-consciousness subscales and the public self-consciousness and social anxiety subscales 
were moderately related (rs = .21–.26 for two samples, N = 604) but that the correlation 
between social anxiety and private self-consciousness fluctuated around zero. 
Subsequent research has associated high private self-consciousness with increased 
awareness of internal sensations (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979), increased attitude con-
sistency across time (Scheier, 1980), higher correlations between self-report measures and 
behavior (Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978), and greater responsiveness to experimental manip-
ulation of mood (Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977). High private self-conscious subjects 
describe themselves more extensively (Franzoi, 1983; Turner, 1978b) and more accurately 
(Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Franzoi, 1983) than those low in private self-consciousness. 
High public self-consciousness has been associated with high self-reported conformity, 
high need for affiliation, low self-esteem, and low risk taking (Tunnell, 1984). In experi-
mental situations, high public self-conscious subjects are more compliant than low public 
self-conscious subjects (Froming & Carver, 1981) and are more likely to moderate privately 
expressed attitudes when those attitudes are to be exposed to others (Scheier, 1980), sug-
gesting that they may be more likely to engage in impression management. Fenigstein 
(1979) demonstrated that high public self-conscious women were more sensitive to passive 
rejection by a peer than low public self-conscious women. 
Schlenker and Leary (1982) and Buss (1980) suggested that high public self-consciousness 
may be a necessary precondition for social anxiety. Schlenker and Leary’s self-presentational 
model postulates that social anxiety is a function of the motivation to make a particular 
impression and doubt that one will be successful. High public self-consciousness may in-
crease the motivational component of the equation by increasing the salience of social 
goals, which may increase attempts at impression management and, consequently, increase 
an individual’s vulnerability to social anxiety. In fact, several studies have demonstrated 
that socially anxious subjects are preoccupied with the public aspects of themselves, in-
cluding how they might be evaluated by others (e.g., Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983), and 
whether or not others will perceive their anxiety (McEwan & Devins, 1983). 
High levels of public self-consciousness may also increase the doubt component of 
Schlenker and Leary’s model by interfering with feedback from the interaction partner 
about the success of self-presentational efforts. In a manner similar to that proposed by 
Wine (1971) and Hartman (1983), excessive self-focused attention may detract from the 
amount of attention focused on the other person, resulting in reduced effectiveness in so-
cial interactions and increased social anxiety. 
Although Fenigstein and colleagues (1975) among others (e.g., Buss, 1980) proposed 
that the SCS may be useful in clinical settings, all of the studies just cited involved college 
students. With rare exceptions (e.g., Puente & Morrisey, 1981), little published normative 
or validational information on the SCS is available for noncollege populations. Therefore, 
an examination of self-consciousness in a clinical, socially anxious population would seem 
to be particularly appropriate. This study examined public and private self-consciousness 
in individuals meeting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition 
(DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) criteria for social phobia. DSM-III de-
fines social phobia as: 
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a persistent, irrational fear of, and compelling desire to avoid, situations in which 
the individual may be exposed to scrutiny by others. . . . Examples of Social Pho-
bias are fears of speaking or performing in public, using public lavatories, eating 
in public, and writing in the presence of others. Usually the individual is aware 
that the fear is that others will detect signs of anxiety in the phobic situation. (p. 227) 
 
It seems likely that concern about being watched or evaluated by others would be related 
to public self-consciousness. On the other hand, private self-consciousness may be related 
to an individual’s subjective experience of anxiety or awareness of physiological changes 
(e.g., increased heart rate) when exposed to phobic events. 
Four hypotheses were investigated in our study. First, it was predicted that public self-
consciousness would be positively correlated with measures of social anxiety. Next, in 
light of previous research with college students (cf. Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier et al., 
1978), it was anticipated that private self-consciousness would be positively related to both 
the intensity of affect reported in response to experimentally induced anxiety and to the 
accuracy of self-reports of anxiety. Finally, because public self-consciousness is defined as 
awareness of those aspects of oneself that are visible to others, it was expected that public 
self-consciousness would be related to the accuracy of social phobics’ reports of their ob-
servable behavior in an anxiety-provoking, social situation. However, we made no specific 
predictions on the nature of this relationship. Because high levels of public self-consciousness 
have been associated with impression management (Framing & Carver, 1981; Scheier, 
1980), it could be argued that public self-consciousness would be positively related to so-
cial phobics’ ability to describe accurately a specific sample of their behavior. In contrast, 
Clark and Arkowitz (1975) demonstrated that socially anxious college students underrated 
their performance in social situations, suggesting that high public self-consciousness may 
be associated with inaccurate self-assessments of performance. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
Subjects were 20 women and 24 men, between the ages of 20 and 51, (M = 30.24, SD = 7.66), 
who sought treatment at the Center for Stress and Anxiety Disorders, State University of 
New York at Albany, for social anxiety in a variety of situations, including heterosocial 
interactions and public speaking. The majority of subjects had some postsecondary educa-
tion, and 47% of the women and 56% of the men were college graduates. Forty-two percent 
of the women and 72% of the men had never married. 
All subjects were screened with the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS; Di-
Nardo, O’Brien, Barlow, Waddell, & Blanchard, 1983) or its recent revision (Barlow, 1985) 
and received a primary diagnosis of social phobia according to DSM-III criteria. The ADIS 
is a structured interview with demonstrated reliability for the diagnosis of anxiety disor-
ders (kappa = .91 for social phobia; Barlow, 1985). Diagnostic interviews were conducted 
by licensed clinical psychologists or advanced doctoral students. In addition to determin-
ing diagnosis, the ADIS interviewer also rated each subject on the Hamilton Anxiety Rat-
ing Scale (Hamilton, 1959) and the Phobic Severity Rating Scale (Watson & Marks, 1971). 
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Only subjects exhibiting moderate to severe impairment in daily functioning, as indicated 
by a severity rating greater than or equal to 4 on the scale ranging from 0 to 8, participated 
in the study (M = 5.64, SD = 1.11). The data presented here are drawn from the extensive 
assessment procedure completed by all subjects prior to entering treatment. This pretreat-
ment assessment included a battery of self-report questionnaires and various measures 
derived from a behavioral simulation of a personally relevant, anxiety-provoking situation. 
 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
All subjects completed the public and private self-consciousness and social anxiety sub-
scales of the SCS.1 Fenigstein and colleagues (1975) reported adequate test-retest correla-
tions for the subscales (rs = .73 to .84), and other studies have supported their discriminant 
validity (Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978). 
In addition to the SCS, each subject completed a variety of questionnaires assessing anx-
iety. These included four measures of various aspects of social-evaluative anxiety: the So-
cial Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969), the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test 
(SISST; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982), and the Personal Report of Confidence as 
a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966). The trait portion of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was used to assess generalized anxiety. Subjects 
also completed the Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAQ; Schwartz, Davidson, 
& Goleman, 1978), a 2-factor scale that examines the frequency of cognitive and somatic 
anxiety symptoms. 
 
Behavioral Simulation 
All subjects participated in a behavioral simulation of an anxiety-provoking situation. In 
order to examine each subject’s anxiety, as it was likely experienced in his or her daily life, 
simulations were individually designed on the basis of questionnaire data and initial in-
terviews to recreate a situation that typically evoked high levels of anxiety. The simulations 
included situations such as initiating a conversation with a member of the opposite sex or 
making a presentation at a staff meeting. Graduate and undergraduate assistants served 
as role-play partners and audience members. 
Each 10-min simulation was divided into three phases. Following a 3-min adaptation 
period for the heart rate assessment (outlined next), the experimenter described the sce-
nario for the upcoming simulation and asked the subject to think about it for 3 min (the 
anticipatory phase). Immediately after the anticipatory phase, subjects were taken to an-
other room in which the audience or role-play partners were ready and waiting. Subjects 
had been previously informed that the simulation would be videotaped, and this room 
contained video recording equipment in full view of the subject. The final phase, referred 
to as the performance phase, consisted of the 4-min role play. 
 
Heart rate 
Subjects’ physiological arousal in anticipation of the simulation and during the simulation 
itself was assessed with a portable heart rate monitor (Exersentry III, Model No. 51330, by 
Respironics, Inc.), described in detail by Heimberg, Gansler, Dodge, and Becker (1987). 
H O P E  A N D  H E I M B E R G ,  J O U R N A L  O F  P E R S O N A L I T Y  A S S E S S M E N T  5 2  (1 9 8 8 )  
5 
Minute-by-minute heart rate (HR; in beats per minute) was calculated separately for adap-
tion, anticipatory, and performance phases. 
 
Subjective anxiety 
Subjects reported their subjective anxiety during the simulation on the Subjective Units of 
Discomfort Scale (SUDS), which ranges from 0 to 100, developed by Wolpe and Lazarus 
(1966). Subjects were prompted for their ratings at 1-min intervals, resulting in three antic-
ipatory and five performance SUDS ratings. 
 
Thought listing 
Cognitive activity in response to the simulation was assessed with the thought listing pro-
cedure, previously used with socially anxious college students (Cacioppo, Glass, & Mer-
luzzi, 1979; Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985; Heimberg, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987). 
Immediately following the simulation, subjects were given forms and were asked to record 
the thoughts they experienced during the performance phase, ignoring spelling, grammar, 
and punctuation. Trained graduate assistants, unaware of the hypotheses of this study, 
later categorized thoughts as positive (facilitating relaxed and effective performance), neg-
ative (hindering relaxed and effective performance), or neutral. Interrater agreement for a 
sample of 17 subjects was 86% for positive thoughts and 95% for negative thoughts (kappas 
= .79 and .93, respectively). 
 
Simulation ratings 
After completing the thought-listing forms, subjects were asked to describe their maxi-
mum anxiety and the quality of their performance during the simulation on single-item 
scales, ranging from 0 to 100 (higher ratings indicating higher anxiety or better perfor-
mance). Undergraduate research assistants who were not directly associated with the 
study viewed the videotapes of the simulations and completed the same two ratings for 
each subject. 
In keeping with the goal of obtaining consensus ratings that would reflect how people 
in the subjects’ daily life would evaluate their performance in an anxiety-provoking situa-
tion, the raters were not specifically trained to rate subjects’ anxiety or performance. Rather, 
they were instructed to use their own criteria and evaluate each subject as if he or she were 
someone they were seeing in a naturally occurring situation. They were further instructed 
not to discuss the ratings among themselves. Although the raters were aware that the sub-
jects were awaiting treatment for social phobia, they were blind to the specific hypotheses 
of the study and to subjects’ scores on all other measures, including the SCS. To further 
facilitate generalizability, each of the six independent raters viewed all of the videotapes, 
as recommended by Farrell, Mariotto, Conger, Curran, and Wallander (1979). 
The intraclass correlation coefficient (Winer, 1982) was calculated as a measure of inter-
rater agreement for the six raters. Despite the absence of formal training, interrater consen-
sus was quite high: r = .89 for maximum anxiety and r = .88 for performance quality. The 
six raters’ scores were averaged for the two variables, and mean consensus ratings were 
used in all statistical analyses. 
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Results 
 
The means and standard deviations for men and women on the three subscales of the SCS 
are presented in the top portion of Table l. Although women’s scores were somewhat more 
variable than men’s, there were no gender differences on any of the subscales. As can be 
seen in the bottom part of Table 1, all three zero-order correlations among the subscales 
were significant (rs = .27 to .53). The partial correlations between public and private self-
consciousness, controlling for social anxiety, and between public self-consciousness and 
social anxiety, controlling for private self-consciousness, were also significant (partial rs = 
.47 and .42, respectively). Private self-consciousness and social anxiety were not related 
when the effects of public self-consciousness were removed (r = .02, ns). Because public 
and private self-consciousness were highly correlated, partial correlations were used to 
test the hypotheses outlined in the introduction. However, both partial and zero-order cor-
relations are reported. 
 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Subscale Correlations for the Self-Consciousness Scale 
 Womena  Menb 
 M SD  M SD 
Private self-consciousness 25.70 7.23  25.08 4.97 
Public self-consciousness 20.70 5.03  20.75 4.45 
Social anxiety 17.00 4.95  17.79 3.67 
 Subscale Correlations 
 Public  Social Anxiety 
Private .53** (.47)**c  .27* (.02) 
Public   .49** (.42)** 
a. n = 20 
b. n = 24 
c. Correlations in parentheses represent partial correlations controlling for the remaining subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .002 
 
As expected, public self-consciousness was positively related to most measures of social 
anxiety, including the PRCS, the SADS, the FNE, the negative self-statement subscale of 
the SISST, the percentage of negative thoughts listed in the thought listing procedure, and 
both subject and consensus ratings of maximum anxiety during the simulation (rs = .31 to 
.68; see Tables 2 and 3). The consensus rating for quality of the simulation performance 
was inversely related to public self-consciousness. Two measures of general anxiety, the 
STAI and the cognitive subscale of the CSAQ, were also positively related to public self-
consciousness. 
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Table 2. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations of Public and Private Self-Consciousness with Self-
Report Questionnaires and Clinical Ratings 
 n Public Private 
Hamilton anxiety 43 .10 (.11)a .00 (–.06) 
Phobic severity 43 .18 (.19) .04 (–.07) 
PRCS 43 .45*** (.47)*** .13 (–.16) 
SADS 43  .36** (.35)** .13 (–.08) 
FNE 44 .71*** (.68)*** .30* (–.12) 
STAI 43 .53*** (.45)*** .33* (.07) 
SISST-positive 42 –.14 (–.22) .06 (.17) 
SISST-negative 42 .48*** (.47)*** .15 (–.14) 
CSAQ-Cognitive 44 .53*** (.37)** .46*** (.25)* 
CSAQ-Somatic 44 .21 (.04) .34** (.27)* 
Notes: ns vary due to missing data. PRCS = Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker. SADS = Social Avoid-
ance and Distress Scale. FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. SISST = 
Social Interaction Self-Statement Test. CSAQ = Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire. 
a. Correlations in parentheses represent partial correlations controlling for the other self-consciousness sub-
scale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 3. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations of Public and Private Self-Consciousness with 
Behavioral Simulation Measures 
 n Public Private 
Total thoughts 43 .35** (.17)a .40** (.27) 
% of negative thoughts 43 .49*** (.38)** .34 (.11) 
% of positive thoughts 43 –.18 (–.15) –.09 (.00) 
Mean SUDS      
     Anticipatory 43 .35** (.23) .31* (.16) 
     Performance 39 .53*** (.49)*** .25 (–.05) 
Mean heart rate      
     Anticipatory 39 .18 (.08) .21 (.15) 
     Performance 37 .13 (.02) .21 (.17) 
Maximum anxiety 
     during simulation 
     
     Subject rating 44 .48*** (.36)** .36** (.14) 
     Consensus rating 38 .32* (.31)* .12 (–.07) 
Performance quality 
     during simulation 
     
     Subject rating 44 –.16 (–.07) –.18 (–.12) 
     Consensus rating 38 –.33* (–.31)* –.13 (.05) 
Notes: ns vary due to missing data. SUDS = Subjective Units of Discomfort. 
a. Correlations in parentheses represent partial correlations controlling for the other self-consciousness sub-
scale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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In contrast, private self-consciousness was generally not related to the anxiety measures 
(see Tables 2 and 3). Although there were significant zero-order correlations between pri-
vate self-consciousness and the FNE, the STAI, the subject’s maximum anxiety rating, the 
total number of thoughts listed; the percentage of negative thoughts listed, and both the 
cognitive and somatic subscales of the CSAQ (rs = .30 to .46), only three of these correla-
tions (total number of thoughts listed and the CSAQ subscales) remained significant when 
the effects of public self-consciousness were removed. 
It was hypothesized that private self-consciousness would be positively correlated with 
subjects’ anxiety in response to the behavioral simulation. This was not confirmed. Private 
self-consciousness was not related to the mean SUDS in anticipation of the simulation (r = 
.16, ns), the mean SUDS during the simulation (r = –.05, ns), or the maximum anxiety rating 
obtained immediately after the simulation (r = .14, ns). 
A comparison was made between SUDS ratings and heart rate, in both the anticipatory 
and performances phases of the behavioral simulation, to test the hypothesis that the sub-
jective anxiety reports of those higher in private self-consciousness would correspond 
more closely to their physiological arousal than the reports of those lower in private self-
consciousness. The correspondence index was calculated by converting HR and SUDS to 
standardized scores, then taking the absolute value of the difference between HR and 
SUDS for each minute. The difference scores were then averaged across each phase, result-
ing in a mean anticipatory HR-SUDS correspondence score and a mean performance HR-
SUDS correspondence score. Neither of these variables were significantly related to private 
self-consciousness (rs = .08 and .15, respectively).2 
It was predicted that public self-consciousness would be related to the accuracy of sub-
jects’ descriptions of themselves in an anxiety-provoking situation. In order to test this hy-
pothesis, the absolute value of the difference between the subject’s performance quality 
rating and observers’ consensus performance quality rating was calculated and served as 
an index of “inaccuracy.” (Note that a smaller inaccuracy index indicates greater agree-
ment between subjects and observers.) High public self-consciousness was marginally as-
sociated with lower levels of disagreement between subjects and objective observers on 
performance quality, r = –.25, p < .067. Private self-consciousness was not related to perfor-
mance quality inaccuracy, r = .09, ns. 
 
Discussion 
 
As would be expected, the social phobics in this sample scored approximately one stand-
ard deviation higher on the social anxiety subscale of the SCS than has been reported for 
college students (Fenigstein et al., 1975). However, they did not differ substantially from 
college students on either of the self-consciousness subscales. Subscale correlations for the 
social phobics were much higher than those reported by Fenigstein and colleagues (1975). 
It is unclear why public and private self-consciousness were more highly related for our 
social phobics than for Fenigstein et al.’s college students. Perhaps public and private self-
consciousness are more similar in social phobics than in college students because much of 
social phobics’ private experience involves anxiety symptoms, which they fear will become 
visible to others (McEwen & Devins, 1983). Thus private self-consciousness may “merge 
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with” public self-consciousness in social phobics as public self-conscious concerns are trig-
gered by the private experience of anxiety. It should be kept in mind, however, that, in 
addition to social anxiety, the social phobics also differed from college students on varia-
bles such as age, socioeconomic status, and marital status. Finally, it should also be noted 
that at least one public-private subscale correlation as high as .54 has been reported for 
college students (Turner, 1978a). 
Public self-consciousness was related to most measures of social anxiety. This relation-
ship was most consistent for the self-report measures. Public self-consciousness did not 
influence clinician ratings of anxiety, but naive observers’ ratings of subjects’ behavior in 
the phobic situation were also related to public self-consciousness scores. It would be in-
teresting to investigate whether the differential impact of public self-consciousness in these 
two assessment settings was due to the presence of a sample of the subject’s behavior in 
the phobic situation, the difference between expert and novice raters, or other factors. 
As expected, private self-consciousness was generally not related to measures of social 
anxiety, with the exception of the CSAQ subscales and the total number of thoughts listed 
in the thought listing procedure. CSAQ items generally ask the subject to rate cognitive 
activity and physiological symptoms. Because previous work has shown that high private 
self-conscious individuals report more extensively and more accurately on internal states 
(e.g., Franzoi, 1983; Scheier et al., 1978), it is not surprising that high private self-conscious 
social phobics identified more cognitive and physiological symptoms of anxiety. In fact, 
when cognitive activity was addressed in a free-response format in the thought listing task, 
high private self-consciousness was again associated with more extensive reporting of cog-
nitive activity. 
We hypothesized that public self-consciousness and performance quality inaccuracy 
would be related and suggested that, based on available evidence, either a positive or neg-
ative relationship was plausible. Although the correlation was only marginally significant, 
these data suggest that high public self-conscious social phobics may report more accu-
rately on their behavior in anxiety-provoking situations than low public self-conscious so-
cial phobics. Failure to find a stronger relationship may be attributable to methodological 
factors. Buss (1980) distinguished between the enduring trait of public self-consciousness, 
as measured by the SCS and a corresponding transient state of public self-awareness, 
which may be experimentally manipulated with presence of mirrors, cameras, and audi-
ences. The presence of the video equipment during the behavioral simulation may have 
induced a uniformly high level of public self-awareness across all subjects, thus reducing 
the impact of individual differences in public self-consciousness. In fact there was a signifi-
cant correlation between consensus ratings and subjects’ ratings for performance quality, 
r = .35, p < .01, indicating at least moderate agreement between subjects and objective ob-
servers, irrespective of subjects’ level of public self-consciousness. 
Putting aside this methodological issue for a moment, consideration of both the accu-
racy of subjects’ perception of their performance and the negative correlation between con-
sensus performance ratings and public self-consciousness suggests a situation in which 
high public self-conscious social phobics may be acutely aware of their poor performances, 
whereas low public self-consciousness social phobics may be relatively unaware of their 
more adequate performance. Although this hypothesis is quite speculative on the basis of 
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this study alone, it deserves further exploration to consider the implications it may have 
for both the etiology and treatment of social phobia. 
The hypothesis concerning how accurately subjects would report on their anxiety in the 
behavioral simulation was not supported. Private self-consciousness did not predict the 
relationship between subjects’ SUDS reports and their HR. Subjects may be unable to ac-
curately monitor their HR regardless of their level of dispositional self-consciousness (Gil-
lis & Carver, 1980). However, Johannsson and Ost (1982) reported that social phobics were 
more accurate than claustrophobics in HR estimation, and Heimberg and colleagues (1987) 
found positive correlations between the somatic subscale of the CSAQ and HR among so-
cial phobics, suggesting that social phobics are aware of their physiological response to 
anxiety. Given these studies and the fact that there was a significant correlation between 
CSAQ-somatic and private self-consciousness, it seems unlikely that private self-con-
sciousness is unrelated to awareness of HR in social phobics. Failure to find the expected 
relationship may be attributable to the instructions subjects received in this study. Subjects 
were instructed to rate their subjective discomfort, not specifically their HR. SUDS ratings 
may have been based on a variety of factors (e.g., cognitive activity, various physiological 
processes, and behavior); HR was only one. This hypothesis should be evaluated in future 
studies by asking subjects to base their SUDS ratings specifically on HR or some other 
measurable physiological symptoms of anxiety. 
Our results are generally supportive of excessive self-focus explanations of social anxi-
ety. However, they do not support the notion that public self-consciousness is a necessary 
prerequisite for social anxiety (Buss, 1980; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) because all subjects 
were severely socially anxious, but a range of public self-consciousness scores were re-
ported. 
Although the possible clinical usefulness of the SCS was discussed in Fenigstein and 
colleagues’ (1975) initial article, this study is one of the first to report using the scale with 
a clinical population. We hope this study may help lay the groundwork for future research 
on the relationship between social anxiety and self-consciousness by demonstrating that 
the SCS is a useful and valid instrument for use with a highly socially anxious clinical 
population. 
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Notes 
 
1. Subsequent to the initiation of data collection for this project, Scheier and Carver (1985) reported 
that noncollege populations may experience difficulty reading the SCS and have published a re-
vised scale. We are unaware of any subjects experiencing difficulty understanding the SCS, and 
because 77% of the subjects had at least some postsecondary education, it is unlikely that scale 
readability is a serious concern. 
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2. All analyses involving HR data were also conducted with HR computed as a change score from 
baseline. This analysis did not affect the outcome of the comparisons with the SCS subscales. 
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